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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
NON-DISCLOSED PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS IN CUSTODY CASES
HELD IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED

In a proceeding brought to change custody of an infant, the parties stipulated that the Family Counseling Unit, an advisory arm of the Family Part
of the Supreme Court, could investigate the principals and report its findings
to the Court. There was no express provision for the non-disclosure of this
report. The original stipulation authorized the family counselor to have the
principals examined by a psychiatrist and a psychologist, but this authorization
was deleted from the final stipulations. In spite of this deletion, the trial court
availed itself of the services of both the psychiatrist and the psychologist. The
lower court considered the reports of all these independent investigations in
reaching its decision but did not disclose them to the parties. In the Court
of Appeals, held: that the trial judge did not err in considering the reports of
the psychiatrist and psychologist and in not disclosing of these reports. Kesseler
v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445, 180 N.E.2d 402, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962). 1
Despite the usefulness of the reports of social scientists in custody suits,
it has been almost universally held that in the absence of stipulation or waiver,
decisions based on such reports, when there has been no disclosure to the
parties are erroneous.&2 Behind these decisions lies the principle that no court
should act in secrecy, and justice should be openly administered. At least one
court held that deciding a case on the basis of evidence not made available
to the parties, and in the absence of consent, amounts to a deprivation of due
process. 3 On the other hand, there are certain practical and legal considerations
which make the common law evidentiary procedures unsatisfactory. 4 Disclosure
in open court of reports which are likely to contain comment on private affairs
of the principals might well aggravate antagonism between the parties and make
amicable settlement more difficult. Another problem is that the reports of
social workers are composed largely of conclusions drawn from interviews with
third persons and as such are inadmissible under the common law hearsay
rule.6 A further contention in favor of nondisclosure is that the social worker
finds it very difficult to obtain candid reports from third persons when they
are aware that their statements will be made known to the parties. 7 It must
be observed that none of these arguments fully apply to the reports of psychiatric and psychological examinations. Since the investigations of the psychiatrist
and the psychologist are centered on the principals, the problem of the hearsay
1.

10 A.D.2d 935, 201 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1st Dep't 1960),

affirming 11 Misc. 2d 607,

178 N.Y.S.2d 160 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
2. Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 144 P.2d 592 (1943); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ill.
App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291 (1955); Tumbleson v. Tumbleson, 117 Ind. App. 455, 73 N.E.2d
59 (1947); Thompson v. Thompson, 238 Minn. 41, 55 N.W.2d 329 (1952).
3. Williams v. Williams, supra note 2.
4. "Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases," 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349

(1956).
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 355.
"Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases," supra note 4, at 358.
"Use of Extra-Record Information in Custody Cases," supra note 4, at 354.
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objection to their testimony in open court would not arise. Although it is
possible that the report of the psychiatrist and the psychologist might contain
comment on the emotional adjustment of the parties, the detached objectivity
of such comment would probably prevent it from increasing bitterness. In
order to mitigate the effect of the common-law rules of evidence when applied
to custody cases and to make available to the trial judge the invaluable research
of social workers, the courts in many jurisdictions have held that when the
parties have so stipulated or have consented by acquiescence, the trial court
may order an independent investigation and act on the reports so obtained
without revealing the information to the parties. This is a statement of the
rule of Rea v. Rea,8 the leading case in the area. The cases which have
so held have been concerned with the reports of the family counselors or
welfare workers and have not specifically dealt with the reports of psychiatric
and psychological examiners.
The New York courts have long held that the parties to a matrimonial
action may stipulate to allow confidential interviews between the judge and
the child and have declared that in custody cases, "the courts are not so
limited that they may not depart from strict adversary concepts." 9
In Kesseler v. Kesseler, the Court of Appeals held that Special Term did
not err in refusing to let the parties examine the family counselor's report
although there was no express stipulation for non-disclosure. The Court declared that "the natural purport of such stipulations, unless they state otherwise, is that the common-law rules of evidence are suspended pro tanto in
adapting to the social nature of the problems to be solved."' 1° The Court found
little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the parties may stipulate the
confidentiality of the reports of family counselors in view of its earlier stand
that interviews between judge and child may be kept confidential pursuant to
stipulation. The Court reversed the Appellate Division and ordered a hearing
de novo because more than three years had passed since the custody change
challenged here had occurred, and because defendant, by placing the infant in
the care of his consort, had not properly complied with the provisions of the
custody decree.
The Court of Appeals did, however, hold that Special Term erred in
considering the reports of the psychiatrist and the psychologist. The problem
is, what was the basis for this part of the Court's decision? Did it follow the
formula established in Rea v. Rea? As previously stated, Rea v. Rea and the
other cases from foreign jurisdictions dealing with the problem of independent
investigations made in connection with custody proceedings, dealt only with
the investigations of family counselors or welfare workers. Was New York
8. 195 Or. 252, 245 P.2d 884 (1952).
9. People ex rel. Fields v. Kaufman, 9 A.D.2d 375, 377, 193 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (1st
Dep't 1959).
10. Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445, 454, 180 N.E.2d 402, 407, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8

(1962).
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unwilling to extend the Rea rule to the reports of psychiatrist and psychologist?
As mentioned previously, the arguments favoring non-disclosure of social
workers' investigations do not fully apply to favor the non-disclosure of reports
of psychiatrists and psychologists. The Court declared that it did not go so
far as to hold that the parties could not stipulate that these reports be made
confidentially to the court, but stated that the parties did not so stipulate
and expressly refused to do so. This statement is a possible ground for an
argument that the Court would refuse to permit consideration of psychiatric
and psychological reports even with stipulation. However, the dissent claimed
that the majority adapted the Rea formula to determine whether independent
investigations made either by social workers, psychiatrists or psychologists are
valid. If the Rea rule has been extended to include investigations by psychiatrists and psychologists, then the Court should have looked to find stipulations
and/or acquiescence of the parties to such investigations, assuming that the
issue of acquiescence was properly raised. Obviously, there was no stipulation
for an investigation; but was there acquiescence? It may be that the deletion
of the stipulation concerning such reports was considered to be such affirmative
action as to bar further investigation of the actions of the parties for the
purpose of finding acquiescence. The appellant had at least three opportunities
to bring the issue of the judge's consideration of the reports in question, yet
failed to do so. On February 17, 1958, when the judge at Special Term
announced his preliminary decision, based in part on the confidential reports,
appellant did not ask to see them. In her motion for reargument, appellant again
failed to object to the use of the reports. Her acquiescence continued through
the decision of April 2, 1958, and the contempt proceedings which followed.
In spite of these actions, the Court refused to find acquiescence on the part of
the appellant. There are four possible bases for the Court's decision that
Special Term erred in considering the reports of the psychiatrist and psychologist. The Court may not have extended the Rea rule to investigations made
by psychiatrists and psychologists, or it may have extended the Rea rule to
include them but did not find acquiescence. Both of these explanations are
based on the assumption that the Court saw a significant distinction between
the family counselor's report and the reports of the psychiatrist and the
psychologist. If this is true, the Court would refuse to permit the consideration
of undisclosed psychiatric and psychological reports even in the face of a
stipulation providing for such consideration. However, it is possible that while
Rea v. Rea and its companion cases dealt only with investigations made by
family counselors, welfare workers, or probation officers, to which the arguments in favor of non-disclosure fully apply, the Court of Appeals was willing
to apply that holding to the investigations of psychiatrists and psychologists
and not consider this action a significant extension of the doctrine. If this is
true, then there are still two alternative explanations for the Court's decision.
The Court may have searched for acquiescence but could not find it. Or it is
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possible that the Court has adopted only part of the rule of Rea v. Rea and
will permit non-disclosure of any independent investigation only when there
has been express stipulation. It appears that no certain explanation can be given.
A. D.
INSURANCE
JuRY TRIAL WAIVED BY LIFE INSURANCE BENEFICIARY THROUGH DILATORY
TACTICS

The insured died approximately nine months after he took out a life policy
in October 1959. The policy contained a clause making it incontestable by the
insurer two years after the date of issue. The insurer notified the beneficiaries
by letter in September 1960, some thirteen months prior to the expiration of the
period of contestability, of its intent to rescind the policy due to alleged fraud
and misrepresentation by the insured in his application for insurance. Subsequently the insurer began a suit for rescission with service of complaint, after
a month of attempting service, on April 25, 1961, seven months after the
notice. The beneficiaries submitted in answer a general denial and a counterclaim demanding that the policy be declared valid and the insurer be declared
liable to them for the face value of the policy. They later moved for a separate
trial of the factual issues raised by the counterclaim and for a stay of the
equity action pending the outcome of the jury trial. The Court of Appeals
held that the Appellate Division1 had not abused its discretion in reversing
the Supreme Court, Special Term order granting the motion. It stated that the
beneficiaries had waived a jury by dilatory tactics in not initiating a suit at
law during the seven months between notice by the insurer and commencement
of the suit in equity. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Conway,
11 N.Y.2d 367, 183 N.E.2d 754, 229 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1962).
The Appellate Division generally has the same discretionary powers as
does the lower branch of the Supreme Court; it may reverse on review any2
discretionary decision of that court even where no abuse of its powers is found.
3
Iowever, a reversal without a finding of abuse is rare. The background of the
entire area of litigation between an insurer and the beneficiaries of the insured
4
under a life policy containing an incontestability clause must be viewed in
light of the basic apprehensive view of juries taken towards insurance carriers.
A number of similar New York cases indicate the common practice of a carrier
of bringing a suit for rescission in equity quickly, or without adequate notice
1. 15 A.D.2d 924, 225 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2d Dep't 1962).
2. O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E.2d 883 (1956); Hogan v. Franken,
221 App. Div. 164, 223 N.Y. Supp. 1 (3d Dep't 1927); 9 Carmody-Wait 573 and cases
footnoted.
3. Hogan v. Franken, supra note 2.
4. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 155(1) (b) for statutory discussion of incontestability clauses.
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